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Abstract
In 2009, the Nigerian banking system witnessed a financial crisis caused by elite borrowers in
the financial market. Regulatory response to the Nigerian crisis closely mirrored the interna-
tional responsewith increased capital and liquidity thresholds for commercial banks.While the
rise of consumer protection on the agenda of prudential supervisors internationally was logical
in that consumer debtwas themain cause of the global recession, theNigerian banking reforms
of 2009 disproportionately affected access by poorer consumers, who ironically had little to do
with the underlying causes of the crisis. As lending criteria become more stringent, poorer
consumers of credit products are pushed into informal markets because of liquidity-induced
credit rationing. Overall, consumer protection is compromised because stronger consumer
protection rules for the formal sector benefits borrowers from formal institutionswho constitute
the minority of borrowers in all markets. While the passage of regulation establishing credit
bureaux and the National Collateral Registry will, in theory, ease access to credit especially by
lower-end borrowers, the vast size of the informal market continues to compound the
information asymmetry problem, fiscal policies to tackle structural economic issues such as
unemployment and illiteracy remain to be initiated, and bank regulators continue to pander to
elite customers with policy responses that endorse too big to fail but deems lower-end
consumers too irrelevant to save. The essay concluded that addressing the wide disparity in
access to credit between the rich and poor through property rights reforms to capture the capital
of the informal class, promoting regulation to check loan concentration, and stimulating
competition by allowing Telecommunication Companies (TELCOs) and fintech companies
to carry on lending activities because of their superior knowledge of lower-end markets will
facilitate greater access. The risk of systemic failure deriving from consumer credit inNigeria is
insignificant compared to the consumer vulnerabilities resulting from the exposure of con-
sumers to unregulated products in the informal market.
Keywords Consumer credit . Financial regulation . Emergingmarkets . Informalmarkets .
Systemic risk
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The banking system in Nigeria witnessed a liquidity crisis in 2009, partly caused by the global
recession, but fundamentally, the outcome of unrelated home-grown issues (Kuye et al. 2013,
p. 174). The Nigeria Stock Exchange lost about 70% of its value in 2007–2008, and the
Central Bank of Nigeria had to intervene with liquidity injection of up to USD 31.1 billion
(Central Bank of Nigeria 2010, p. 58).
Since the global recession (2007–2009), the link between consumer debt and financial
stability has received considerable attention (US Department of the Treasury 2009, pp. 55–61).
The main causes of the recession were subprime mortgages, the mass selling of securities
backed by subprime mortgages to firms outside the traditional banking system, little under-
standing of these complex products by regulators, and the transboundary marketing of these
products (Bernanke et al. 2019, p. 11). The consequences for households such as foreclosures
and failed investments focused attention on excessive household leverage and its implications
for the financial system. Before the recession, consumer debt was considered a consumer
protection concern but not as a major systemic risk factor. Following directly from the lessons
of the recession, regulators across the world have adopted a new approach to regulation that
locates consumer debt within the purview of prudential regulation (European Commission
2012, p. 94; HM Treasury 2009, p. 103). Consumer credit and debt, for the purposes of this
paper, embraces “both money that is lent and borrowed as money, without being specifically
tied to the purchase of any particular goods and services, and also any part of the purchase
price of specific goods and services that is not paid on the spot but deferred for later
settlement” (Committee on Consumer Credit Law 1971, p. 13). Accordingly, the analyses
will focus on the protection of users of consumer credit (consumer borrowers) rather than
consumers of banking or financial services generally. Specifically, it focuses on borrowers at
the bottom of the market pyramid described here variously as “lower-end,” “low-income,”
“poor,” or “informal sector” borrowers. This includes the people employed in the informal
economy, e.g., petty traders, farmers, junior civil servants, and the 95% of Nigerian adults who
are unable to access credit from the formal markets according to the Central Bank of Nigeria.
Regulatory response to the Nigerian crisis has closely mirrored the international response
with increased capital and liquidity thresholds for commercial banks. The intervention of the
Central Bank of Nigeria was predicated on the need to avoid a systemic collapse and to ensure
the protection of financial consumers. While the renewed focus on consumer protection since
the recession is a positive step, some of the policies introduced to achieve this by prudential
supervisors limit financial access for the more vulnerable credit consumers especially in
emerging market economies where credit uptake amongst Micro, Small, and Medium Scale
Enterprises (MSMEs) and individual consumers is remarkably low.
This essay will argue that the Nigerian banking reforms of 2009 disproportionately affected
access by poorer consumers, who ironically had little to do with the underlying causes of the
crisis. The integration of consumer protection into prudential oversight at the international
level is logical in that consumer debt was the main cause of the global recession. It, however,
speaks to the dissonance between international approaches to financial regulation and the
realities of developing and emerging economies. Rather than strengthen consumer protection,
tighter prudential requirements have had the effect of excluding lower-end borrowers from the
formal market, and therefore affording protection for the elite few who remain in the formal
market, and ironically responsible for the Nigerian bank crisis of 2009.
The first part provides a brief historical account of consumer lending in Nigeria and an
overview of the banking crisis of 2009 and the regulatory reforms that were implemented. The
second part will argue that the reforms implemented made it harder for lower-end consumers to
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access formal credit products, forcing them to subscribe to unregulated credit products. The
third part will attempt a cost-benefit analysis of the reforms and argues that while the passage
of regulation establishing credit bureaux and the National Collateral Registry will, in theory,
ease access to credit especially by lower-end borrowers, the vast size of the informal market
continues to compound the information asymmetry problem, fiscal policies to tackle structural
economic issues such as unemployment and illiteracy remain to be initiated, and bank
regulators continue to pander to elite customers with policy responses that endorse too big
to fail but deems lower-end consumers too irrelevant to save. The essay concludes that the risk
of systemic failure deriving from consumer credit in Nigeria is insignificant compared to the
consumer vulnerabilities resulting from the exposure of consumers to unregulated products in
the informal market.
A Brief History of Consumer Lending in Nigeria
Consumer policy in developing countries is inextricably linked to global systems. In Nigeria,
colonial legacies such as the inherited legal system and banking model continue to operate
with mixed outcomes for consumers, while policies of high-income countries on trade and
investment, security, and intellectual property rights continue to influence domestic policy and
impact significantly on economic growth and living standards in developing countries. For
instance, many developing countries show an obsession with improving scores on the World
Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index with a view to attracting foreign investment. While this
is not necessarily a bad thing to do, there has been scepticism about its relevance to real
improvement in national business environments (McCormack 2018).
Immediately after gaining independence from Britain in 1960, the Nigerian government
adopted an interventionist (state-centric) approach to stimulate economic development via
measures including free education and healthcare programmes, interest rate controls, and direct
allocation of credit to priority sectors and rural areas where private financial institutions would
not ordinarily direct resources (Woods 2006, p. 141;World Bank 1989, pp. 1–3). These policies
benefitted most citizens, regardless of social and economic class. Credit offers opportunities for
households to accumulate wealth and expand job opportunities (Bar-Gill and Warren 2008, p.
5). People borrow to smooth temporarily unstable income, and particularly in times of wider
economic downturn, credit is beneficial even when it is expensive (Bertrand et al. 2010, p. 302;
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni 2011, pp. 1429–1430; Morse 2011, pp. 28–29). Families in distress
can count on credit as a critical safety net when they face economic shocks such as a job loss,
failed marriages, or ill heath, with the promise to pay back in the future when things get better.
Public policy seems to accept this welfare-enhancing quality of consumer credit gradually.
The European Union's (EU) commitment to a market-driven approach to financial inclusion is
predicated on the vision of cheap credit as a means of achieving financial and social inclusion
(Comparato 2016, pp. 9–10). The vision of credit as a social safety net was also pursued in post-
apartheid South Africa, while the Community Reinvestment Act 1977 in the United States of
America (USA) also reflects this approach in some ways (James 2015, p. 15).
State welfare programmes in Nigeria between 1960 and 1983, however, were in part made
possible by the oil booms of the 1970s and heavy borrowing from international institutions
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This borrowing and the
subsequent dependence on foreign technical support made it possible for these external
institutions to gain a foothold on the domestic policy landscape of Nigeria (Woods 2006, p.
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141). This period (1983–1989) marked the rebirth of monetarism in Nigeria through the
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (Sofola 1988, pp. 202–203). The World Bank’s
solutions to the economic problem of Nigeria consisted mainly in privatization, liberalization,
and formalization (World Bank 1989, p. 3). Privatization and liberalization, according to the
institutions, would make for better competition, and allowing market forces to thrive by
removing controls, “directed credit” programmes and subsidies would serve the economy
better. Thus, SAP emphasized credit availability but ignored the question “to whom?”
While the international institutions were right to point out the implementation failures of the
state-centric model riddled by official corruption, rapid inflation, and other macroeconomic
imbalances, monetarism and financial liberalization ignore the social and economic well-being
objectives that the previous model sought to achieve by promoting access to affordable
finance. As far as SAP went, the individual welfare of consumers was an afterthought. This
critique of SAP continues to be relevant in the present day because some of its negative
consequences for consumers in affected countries continue to be seen (Konadu-Agyemang
2001, p. 456). Although this paper is not primarily a critique of SAP, a brief analysis of SAP
provides the necessary context for understanding the research question. By devaluing the Naira
and implementing government austerity introducing tuition and surcharges for health services,
access to basic services like education and healthcare declined significantly, and the overall
quality of services was undermined. Thus, SAP increased the demand for consumer credit and
decreased the opportunity to access safe credit products in the newly deregulated market. The
resulting adverse conditions grossly diminished individual and collective capacities to save,
invest, and fund consumption without borrowing. Beyond these immediate consequences,
Nigeria is stuck on the policy path charted by SAP despite the World Bank and OECD
countries embracing a more regulatory approach to credit regulation generally. For instance,
the World Bank’s Good Practices for Financial Consumer Protection 2017 promotes ex ante
approaches to consumer protection and embraces behavioural science in regulatory policy,
signalling a willingness to depart from neo-classical economics assumption of consumers as
rational agents where the empirical evidence proves otherwise (World Bank 2017).
The persistence of regulatory policy orthodoxy in Nigeria (i.e., in contrast to the shifting
regulatory approach in international financial institutions and regulators in advanced countries)
is not surprising since developing countries are less likely to experience the convergence of the
strong institutions, political ideology, and technocratic tools necessary for switching policy
paradigms where the likely principal beneficiaries are non-elite groups (Capoccia 2015, p. 150;
Hall 1993, p. 275). It is against this background that this paper was conceived.
The Nigerian Banking Crisis 2009
Since 2001, Nigeria adopted the Universal Banking (UB) model, which permitted banks to
expand into non-traditional bank businesses (Sanusi 2012, p. 116). In 2005, the Central Bank
of Nigeria (CBN) raised the capital base for banks in Nigeria from N2 billion [USD 13 424
200] to a minimum of N25 billion [USD 167 803 000] (Apati 2012, p. 52; Sanusi 2010, p. 2).
Consequently, the 89 licensed banks, through mergers and acquisitions, coalesced into 25 and
later 24. In spite of the consolidation, the banking system in Nigeria witnessed a liquidity crisis
in 2009, partly caused by the global recession, but a majority of the underlying concerns were
home grown (Kuye et al. 2013, p. 174). According to the Central Bank of Nigeria (2010, p.
58), the factors that led to this crisis include the following:
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1. Large and sudden capital inflows that created macroeconomic instability: Capital inflows
from high crude oil sale created a procyclical spending habit in public expenditure while
the excess liquidity also created by the influx of foreign investment encouraged banks into
lending to non-priority sectors such as the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE), mostly in the
form of margin loans and proprietary trading, disguised as loans (Central Bank of Nigeria
2010, p. 58). Nigerian banks were highly exposed to the oil and gas sector, which rode on
high oil prices. With the global recession forcing down crude oil prices, the bubble bust
with an adverse effect on the oil and gas sector, the capital market, and the banks.
2. Critical gaps in the regulatory framework and regulation: Reports of fraud in several
banks were left untreated in spite of being aware of the same. The Financial Services
Regulation Coordinating Committee, which is vested with that mandate, did not meet for
two years.
3. Weaknesses in the business environment: Poor banking practices were rampant. From
poor infrastructure to the absence of credible rating agencies which made an assessment of
creditworthiness difficult. More importantly, the legal process was cumbersome, making
the recovery of debt and bank foreclosure on borrowers difficult. This facilitated the abuse
of bank credits by borrowers (Central Bank of Nigeria 2010, p. 58).
Additional issues include corporate governance failures, insufficient disclosure and transpar-
ency on the exact financial position of banks, double standards in supervision and enforcement
by regulators, and poor governance and management methods at the CBN (Central Bank of
Nigeria 2010, p. 58).
Government Response to the Crisis
Following a stress test carried out by the CBN in August 2009, eight banks were found to be
distressed (Central Bank of Nigeria 2010, p. 58). The banks had accumulated USD 11 billion
non-performing loans (NPL). These banks were directed to seek new investments before
August 2011 or have their licences revoked.
In addition to the liquidity support of USD 4 billion:
i. The CBN reviewed the UB Model and directed banks to focus on core banking business
and banks working as private equity, and venture capital funds were required to divest
accordingly.
ii. Bank chief executives were removed, and tenure limits for chief executive officers were
restricted to 10 years. Sixteen senior bank officials were prosecuted for charges that
included fraud, lending to non-existent companies, lending to companies owned by them,
and conspiring with stockbrokers to boost share prices.
iii. The CBN imposed an additional 1% of capital on the systemically important banks (SIB)
as higher loss absorbency (HLA) charge, in addition to the prescribed minimum capital
adequacy ratio (CAR) of 15%, taking the overall CAR to 16% and a liquidity ratio of
35% (Central Bank of Nigeria 2010, p. 58; This Day Live 2015).
iv. Establishment of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) with the
mandate to acquire the NPLs of Eligible Financial Institutions (EFIs); to inject capital into
the intervened banks so as to stave off insolvency; and to manage acquired assets in a
profitable manner that avoids losses to the taxpayers (Chike-Obi 2014; Wallace 2015). It
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used bonds to bail out ten lenders and buy more than 12 000 loans from industries
including aviation, gasoline, marketing, and manufacturing for about 1.8 trillion Naira
(USD 9 billion) (Sanusi 2012, p. 117).
v. The Federal Government through the Central Bank sought to stimulate the market by
approving bailout funds to state governments which were facing a solvency crisis of their
own. This was necessitated by the reality of the country’s political economy. Nigeria
operates a federal political structure but a unitary fiscal system such that state governments
are financially dependent on the central government for revenue to pay wages and run
government.
Although AMCON claims to have recovered 57% of the NPLs (Wallace 2015), it has also
recorded a total loss of USD 20.8 billion between 2010 and 2012, and USD 1.2 billion in 2016
(AMCON 2018). The rationale for intervention is that the loss to the public treasury is less
than the systemic failure that could have resulted had the CBN and AMCON not intervened as
they did. However, the point of detailing the losses in this essay is to emphasize how a few
elite borrowers and irresponsible bank executives cost the tax payer fortunes, and how poorer
borrowers bear the burden of resulting regulation disproportionately. The following sections
explain this point in greater detail.
Macroprudential Policy, Consumer Protection, and Access to Finance
in Nigeria
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision initiated a set of reforms to strengthen the
resilience of financial institutions, particularly, Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs).
GSIBs were required to hold more capital and of higher quality as a ratio of their total lending.
More so, they were required to hold more liquid assets and cash to check bank runs (Bank for
International Settlements 2017, p. 1). The principal objective of the requirements was to ensure
that banks are “sufficiently resilient to withstand losses in times of stress” (Bank for
International Settlements 2017, p. 1).
The reforms came at a cost to economic growth and consumer welfare in the short term
even though projected benefits were expected to manifest over the long term. According to the
report of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Financial Stability Board, the
estimated cost of the reforms would be an output loss of 0.03% per annum (Bank for
International Settlements 2010, p. 1). The International Institute of Finance (IIF) on the other
hand published a less optimistic estimate of a 3.2% lower level of GDP growth after five years
with an output loss of 0.7% per annum (Institute of International Finance 2011, p. 9). An
OECD study estimated an average increase in lending spreads of 50 basis points by 2019 and
found that a 1% increase in bank capital requirement could create an average negative impact
of 0.04% per annum and 0.20% on the GDP level five years after implementation (Slovik and
Cournède 2011, p. 9).
In practice, higher capital and liquidity ratios constrain access to credit, especially by lower-
end consumers. This class of borrowers is typically considered to be riskier and usually have to
pay more where credit is advanced to them (Ramsay 2012, p. 44). In emerging markets, the
adverse impact of increased liquidity and capital requirements on credit flows to small
businesses and individual consumers is more prominent as lenders confront persistent liquidity
shortages due to shallow capital markets and customers’ lack of capacity to leave deposits with
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banks for a long time (Sinha et al. 2011, p. 78). A cursory study of three African financial
markets – Ethiopia, Kenya, and Lesotho – found that despite increased competition and greater
effort to promote financial inclusion, the weak funding structure (a bank-based financial
system) of financial institutions makes it difficult for the lower end of the market to access
credit (Gottschalk 2015, p. 5).
The problem of Basel II for Nigeria is not whether the objectives are altruistic or not, or that
developing countries, including Nigeria, have to choose between financial inclusion and
financial stability. That, of course, is a false choice considering that effective regulation can
balance both needs. The critique of interest here is that BASEL II is only one of the prudential
policy tools that could be implemented to stabilize the economy, ineffective when applied in
isolation, and the tool that hurts lower-end borrowers the most. Obsession with higher liquidity
and capital requirement, without adequate regulation to address loan concentration and
proprietary trading is ineffective as a prudential tool for Nigeria (and by extension other
Sub-Saharan African markets) because of the existing high magnitude of non-performing
loans and the extremely volatile financial environment (Kasekende et al. 2011, p. 11; Loayza
et al. 2007, p. 347). Nigeria’s HLA and CAR, like in many other African countries, was
already above BASEL III but that in itself could not prevent the crisis of 2009 (Kasekende
et al. 2011, p. 11).
As noted in the earlier section, sudden capital inflows into Nigeria created excess liquidity
which encouraged banks into lending to non-priority sectors such as the NSE, mostly in the form
of margin loans and proprietary trading, disguised as loans. However, only a handful of
individuals benefitted from the heightened appetite for lending by financial institutions within
this period, which in turn invested in a narrow set of volatile assets. Thus, loan concentration in a
few borrowers and confined to a narrow sector, as is historically the case with African economies
(Narain et al. 2003, p. 3), was the primal systemic risk factor, further complicated by weaknesses
in the legal system which impede banks’ ability to recover loans and foreclose on loan security.
The Central Bank of Nigeria by adopting the reforms highlighted earlier including increasing
the HLA and CAR of SIBs to 16% and raising the liquidity ratio to 35%was able to avert the risk
of systemic failure. The measures taken however were incomplete in that the issue of loan
concentration was not addressed, and had unintended but harsh consequences on consumer
lending and access to finance. Some 93% of potential borrowers could not access a loan in 2012,
and despite a total of around 42million adults in employment, Nigeria only has 8.2million active
borrowers, of whom a mere 1.6 million held loans from banks in 2012 (Oxford Business Group
2015). According to the Financial Inclusion Secretariat, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), formal
sector credit penetration as a ratio of the adult population in Nigeria was below 5.3% in 2017,
while interest rates range from 16.68 to 49% (Euromonitor International 2018). However, gaps in
access to finance in Nigeria are differentiated with higher exclusion levels recorded amongst
women, rural dwellers, youth, people living in North East and North-West Nigeria, the disabled
and Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (CBN 2018, p. 13).
Why International Rules Are Often Ineffective in Developing Markets
There exists a mismatch between international policy prescriptions and the regulatory chal-
lenges of developing economies. This mismatch has been demonstrated in this essay in the
context of post-global recession reforms of credit regulation and banking reforms around
capital and liquidity ratios. This is, however, not surprising given that policy makers from
emerging markets, especially sub-Saharan African countries, hardly participate in the rule-
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making processes. International consumer policy is overwhelmingly the output of deliberations
by the club of rich countries. At the IMF and World Bank where developing countries are
guaranteed a seat at the table, votes are allocated according to an unevenly weighted quota,
with 41.72% of the votes held by G7 countries (Woods 2006, pp. 141–155). It achieves its
ends often through national courts via the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards, sanctioning the seizure of assets of poor countries during sovereign defaults, or
declining jurisdiction over abuses by MNCs. More controversial, however, is the conduct of
international financial regulation through international soft law regulation facilitated by net-
work governance (Muir-Watt 2011, pp. 347–348; Muir-Watt 2015, p. 1). International standard
setting bodies such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Financial Stability Board,
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank consist mostly of unelected experts who
make financial rules that even when qualified as voluntary, are enforced in jurisdictions
unrepresented in these clubs. The IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP)
considers the observance of standards and codes issued by these bodies as part of its
assessment of prudential regulations and supervision even where the country under assessment
is not a member of the institution issuing the standard or code (Brummer 2010, p. 384;
Onagoruwa 2014, p. 258).
Several arguments have been advanced for the failure to include poorer countries in
international regulatory authority. The most prominent is that developing countries cannot
make meaningful contributions to the policy formulation process (Santos 2012, p. 551; Shaffer
et al. 2015, p. 595). This may well be true, but without participation, developing countries
could never build requisite capacity. Another argument is that maintaining a small-size
membership is central to the effectiveness of these bodies. There is, however, a large body
of empirical findings that contradict this conclusion (Campos and Nugent 1999, p. 439;
McCallum and Blais 1987, pp. 1–2; Underhill and Zhang 2006, p. 49). Rather, this framework
only succeeds in perpetuating neo-colonialism (Shaffer et al. 2015, pp. 595–597). The point
here is neither to argue that soft law is bad nor that OECD members lack the technical
expertise to make sound consumer policy. The argument is that developing countries do have
issues that go beyond the reach of the agenda of the standard setting bodies and national
regulators must make a policy of filling such gaps and also act as counter-hegemons by not
simply applying these norms but being able to “resist, block, translate, adapt, and hybridize
them, giving rise to localized globalisms” (Shaffer et al. 2015, p. 601). For instance, the
implementation of neoliberal policies such as privatization is based on assumptions that
existing institutions like the Bureau of Public Enterprises in Nigeria will organize a transparent
auction with competitive bidding taking place. However, privatization in the past has become
an avenue for public servants to sell government assets to themselves for cheap while
siphoning the proceeds of the sale to private accounts.
Similarly, deregulation in the absence of well-established financial infrastructure has fuelled
more loan concentration, speculation, and corrupt patronage between bank boards and regulators.
Another example is the responsibility that national regulators must bear for resolving tensions
between imported legal systems and customary business practices that work for local consumers.
In all these examples, national regulators are better placed to make the right policy choices
because of their deeper understanding of the domestic challenges. The perceived fairness of the
UN Model Tax Treaty to developing countries over the OECD model in the allocation of taxing
powers is considered by some as “evidence of the gains of diversity” on rule-making bodies
(Anderson 2005, p. 1278; Onagoruwa 2014, p. 258). It is important to make the point that mere
inclusion without consequential voting powers is almost as deplorable as absolute exclusion.
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Secondly, if there is one lesson to learn from the aftermath of the global recession, it is that
technical infallibility is not a criterion for inclusion in network governance.
In the next section, I will argue that the majority of consumers excluded from accessing
credit in formal markets resort to informal markets (and outside prudential oversight) which
undermines consumer protection as their vulnerabilities are most likely to be exploited in this
sector. I will critically assess the overall consumer credit uptake levels and the risk that poses to
financial stability in Nigeria.
Safe Products for the Rich, Unregulated Products for the Poor
Informal Credit and Consumer Harm
This Section argues that rather than protect consumers, which is a direct objective of
integrating consumer protection into prudential policy post-global recession, regulation in
Nigeria has pursued financial stability at the expense of lower-end consumers.
Developing countries typically maintain a dual economywhere an informal market co-exists
with a formal one, and operators are often able to access services in either or both markets
concurrently or at different times (Jain 1999, p. 419; Kochar 1997, p. 339; Yuan andXu 2015, p.
232). Nigeria’s informal sector forms 65% of gross domestic product, larger than those of
Brazil, Ghana, Turkey, Malaysia, and South Africa according to World Bank estimation
(International Monetary Fund 2017, p. 50; Sanusi 2010, p. 8). Common obstacles to accessing
formal credit by lower-end borrowers in Nigeria include stringent Know-Your-Customer
(KYC) requirements necessitated in part by anti-money laundering regulations, lenders’ pref-
erence for corporate and high-net-worth borrowers, and the prevalence of a relational lending
culture in commercial banks which significantly makes social proximity to bank managers
salient to the success of loan applications (Apati 2012, pp. 1–15; Kang 2018, p. 695; Odetola
2018; Udry 1990; Woods 2006, pp. 150–155;World Bank 1989, p. 3). For example, Section 20
of the Banks and Other Financial InstitutionsAct 2004 generally discourages unsecured lending
by banks and provides for civil and criminal liabilities for bank officers and corporate liabilities
for the bank. This has created a business climate where formal lenders have little appetite for
risk-taking. As lower-end borrowers are more likely to apply for unsecured loans and less likely
to own collateral, this provision naturally impacts them more harshly (Bertola et al. 2006).
These obstacles make it difficult for formal lenders to appraise the credit risk profile of
individual borrowers and the likelihood of loan recovery, and therefore, unwilling to lend
(CBN 2018, p. 13). Although the Civil Procedure Rules of the various States of the Federation
make provision for a fast track rule towards disposing off matters of liquidated money demands
which are often filed on the undefended list, shrewd lawyers always figure a way to move such
matters to the General Cause list where litigation gets protracted.1 With the hardship of debt
recovery in Nigeria, lending, especially to the poor, poses a clear moral hazard as the gain
derivable from non-repayment outweighs the punishment for default (Zinman 2014).
1 For instance, the Nigerian Supreme Court case of Khaled Barakat Chami V. U.B.A. Plc (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt.
1191) 474 SC was first originated in the High Court in 1999 but the judgement of the Supreme Court was only
delivered 11 years after in 2010. Similarly, in the Supreme Court case of Chief Peter Amadi Nwankwo & Anor v.
Ecumenical Development Co-Operative Society (EDCS) U.A. (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt.1027) 377, litigation on a loan
due to be repaid by the appellants in 1990 lasted up to 2007 when the apex court delivered its judgement on an
issue of procedure without delving into the substantive issue of the debt.
A Tale of Two Markets: How Lower-end Borrowers Are Punished for Bank...
The vast majority of borrowers in Nigeria unable to access credit from formal institutions
turn to informal lenders to meet their needs. On the positive side, it is an easier place to access
loans for people who may not be able to meet the requirements of formal lenders by reason of
working in the informal economy (Babajide 2011, p. 24; Diaz-Moriana and O’Gorman 2013,
p. 630). Very often, the lender and borrower belong to the same family, social circles, labour
union, or share a certain sense of community (Heath and Calvert 2013, p. 1120). This relational
model presents additional advantages potentially, in terms of fairer interest rates, the flexibility
of repayment, or a distinct level of lender compassion that is often not afforded by formal
contracts (Heath and Calvert 2013, p. 1120). While the informal market thrives because of its
informational advantage over the formal sector (Bell et al. 1997, p. 557; Kochar 1997, p. 339),
from a consumer protection perspective, it presents a greater difficulty for monitoring the
welfare implication of credit contracts for borrowers. In the absence of regulation, lenders set
the terms and consumers are often subjected to their whims and caprices (Rona-Tas and
Guseva 2018, p. 55). For example, informal contracts are often unwritten and therefore
unclear, and lenders often resort to extra-legal means for debt recovery.2The poor socio-
economic backgrounds of the consumers in question create an inequality of bargaining power
resulting in welfare reducing transactions.
It must be clarified at this point that higher capital and liquidity requirements are not to
blame for consumers’ inability to provide formal documentation such as biometric identifica-
tion cards or valid collateral. However, increased HLA and liquidity requirements compromise
the capacity and willingness of formal lending institutions such as commercial banks to invest
in learning how to collect and process alternative forms of data that could qualify lower-end
consumers for access to credit in the formal market. This happens where banks have lower
liquidity and therefore, less incentive to lend to a “riskier pool” of borrowers. It is also evident
in the reluctance of traditional lenders to invest in financial technology models that could
enable them to serve the poor despite the initial regulatory advantage banks enjoyed over
fintech operators and Mobile Telecommunication Companies (TELCOs) in Nigeria.3 This is in
contrast to policy in some other sub-Saharan African countries where fintech and TELCOs
were allowed to compete with banks for banking business (International Finance Corporation
2012, p. 34).
CBN regulation such as the Mobile Money Regulations of 2009 expressly excluded
TELCOs from accepting mobile money deposits from depositors or engaging in activities
that mimicked traditional banking, e.g., lending. In 2018, the CBN introduced new Guidelines
for Licensing and Regulation of Payment Service Banks in Nigeria, which allow TELCOs to
undertake some banking activities but expressly prohibited lending.4 Ironically, TELCOs have
proved to be more adept at serving lower-end consumers in developing countries with MPESA
and MoKash revolutionizing financial services delivery to the poor in Kenya and Rwanda,
respectively (MTN Rwanda 2018). The same has also been implemented in Ghana with
2 Illegal debt recovery practices by lenders and law enforcement agencies involving the intimidation, physical
violence, detention, arbitrary seizure of borrowers’ assets, and other breaches of the fundamental rights of
borrowers have been documented in a long line of case law in Nigeria. See Economic & Financial Crimes
Commission V. Diamond Bank Plc & Ors (2018) LPELR-44217(SC). See also A. G. Plateau State v A. G
Nasarawa (2005) 129 LRCN 1523 at 1531; UNIBIZ v Commercial Bank (2005) 125 LRCN 1484 at 1495;
University of Ilorin v Oyelana (2001) FWLR (Pt. 83) 2193 at 2209.
3 See for example The CBN’s Guidelines for the Regulation of Agent Banking and Agent Banking Relationships
in Nigeria 2013; the Mobile Money Regulations 2009; and the Guidelines for Licensing and Regulation of
Payment Service Banks in Nigeria 2018.
4 Para. 4, Guidelines for Licensing and Regulation of Payment Service Banks in Nigeria 2018
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reasonable success (Ghana National Communications Authority 2018). The lack of competi-
tion from other service providers and consequent low investment in an algorithm-driven
process mean that Nigerian banks continue to rely on traditional screening methods such as
requirements that borrowers have a white-collar job with the salary account domiciled in the
bank or owned valid collateral before loan applications receive consideration.
The ownership of valid collateral is historically significant for understanding the
disparity in credit advances to elite and lower-end borrowers. For one, the legal process
for the determination of valid collateral is unfair to the poor, especially borrowers who
hold assets that are not in the acceptable legal form. The reality is that many “poor”
borrowers own private properties such as land, houses, and apartments for which they
have not obtained a formal certificate of occupancy or right of occupancy from the state,
and in many cases have built houses without official government permits. The injustice
of this is in two dimensions. First, similar to the dual economy described earlier, the
country operates two systems of land ownership where customary titles, registered titles,
and instruments are recognized as conferring equitable rights (dead capital), whereas
only a government certificate or right of occupancy (depending on whether the land is
classified as urban or rural) confers legal title (live capital). Less than 3% of Nigerian
land has registered titles (Presidential Technical Committee on Land Reform 2013),
meaning poorer borrowers are more likely to hold only customary titles and build
without government permits and consequently enjoy less access to formal credit. The
injustice of this is not that creditors and regulators privilege asset holders over non-asset
holders in terms of credit access, but that the type of ownership available to the poor
(equitable rights) is rendered ineligible by regulation and by implication market realities
around contract enforcement:
…Most of the poor already possess the assets they need to make a success of capitalism.
..But they hold these resources in defective forms: Houses built on land whose owner-
ship rights are not adequately recorded, unincorporated businesses with undefined
liability, industries located where financiers and investors cannot see them. Because
the rights to these possessions are not adequately documented, these assets cannot
readily be turned into capital, cannot be traded outside of narrow local circles where
people know and trust each other, cannot be used as collateral for a loan, and cannot be
used as a share against an investment. (de Soto 2017, p. 12).
The second dimension of injustice is the fact that most holders of equitable title do not hold the
legal title for no failure of theirs but rather are victims of an inefficient regulatory regime, and a
failure of the government to attend to the housing needs of her citizenry. The Land Use Act
1978 requires the Governor to consent to not just the initial allotment of the land but to any
subsequent assignment of interest by the initial allottee to subsequent buyers. Failure to do so
means that such a buyer can only acquire an equitable interest and because of the sheer
administrative demands of procuring the governor’s consent, parties to most land transactions
seek to avoid the process using legal instruments such as a Power of Attorney which while not
an instrument of transfer of legal title and therefore not valid for collateral, gives effective
ownership to the buyer. According to de Soto, legislation such as the Land Use Act 1978
represent a legacy of colonial law in most developing countries that is “tilt[ed] toward
protecting ownership,” and “why most of the assets in developing and former communist
countries have slipped out of the formal legal system in search of mobility.” (de Soto 2017, p.
38).
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The rich, in contrast, can manipulate the application process through bribery and other
corrupt practices or through innocuous behaviours such as tipping officials which guarantee
that the process for getting the governor’s consent is expedited. This is not to mention the
unique case of customary title holders who are unaware of the Land Use Act due to illiteracy,
and are unable to navigate the process or to afford the administrative fees needed to apply for
the governor’s consent. De Soto highlights this hardship eloquently thus:
But they are only a tiny minority-those who can afford the expert lawyers, insider
connections, and patience required to navigate the red tape of their property systems.
The great majority of people, who cannot get the fruits of their labor [sic] represented by
the formal property system, live outside Braudel’s bell jar. (de Soto 2017, p. 42).
While regulators have moved increased capital requirements for banks, a regulation that
supports banks to use capital to increase liquidity is not in place. Instead, regulators in Nigeria
have focused narrowly on the physical assets of financial institutions, and increasing tangible
capital without much effort to channel the incorporeal productive potential of the capital
towards financial inclusion initiatives. For instance, there is no coherent regulatory framework
for securitization in Nigeria. However, from a credit user perspective, there is no regulatory
effort to assist the poor who are undercapitalized by holding assets in unacceptable legal forms.
Beyond the procedural injustice of collateral requirements, excessive reliance on collaterals
for several years before the 2009 banking crisis created a situation where the supply of credit
was perversely increased to the top end of the market, while credit to the bottom end (e.g.,
consumer lending and lending to MSMEs) was rationed. Standard economic analysis suggests
that lenders respond to adverse selection by setting the interest rate so low as to be attractive to
“good” borrowers, and control the risk of default by “bad” borrowers by rationing credit to
both high and low-risk borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, p. 408). In Nigeria, possession of
collateral meant a low-risk assessment. According to the Central Bank of Nigeria, a group of
250 rich borrowers accounted for USD 231.4 million of the total NPL sum of USD 7.5 billion
(CBN 2009). These borrowers deemed “good” defaulted because a good lot of the collaterals
were overvalued in an overly speculative real estate market, and as AMCON would later find
out, a substantial proportion of recovered collaterals were illiquid. It was also not surprising
that many borrowers were insensitive to the high rate of interest (Jibrin et al. 2015, p. 14) as
they acted in cahoots with bank CEOs and Managing Directors and had no intention of
repaying the loans ab initio.5 In essence, the system that was designed to keep out poor, non-
asset holders from borrowing, adversely selected rich but bad borrowers. There is an infor-
mation asymmetry problem resulting in reforms that have further constrained access to credit
by non-collateral or white-collar job holders (Ramsay 2012, pp. 42–44).
Consumers of informal credit suffer other forms of disadvantage that are equally welfare
reducing. Lenders in informal markets often cannot provide the sums required by borrowers,
whereas consumers’ options are finite as they tend to have a limited social network and lack
the financial means to invest in the social capital to expand this network (Yuan and Xu 2015, p.
232). It is also important to note that consumer loans in developing countries are frequently
used for purposes that qualify as investment rather than “consumption.” For example, loans to
MSMEs may be spent on farming to provide food for the family (which could also be sold for
profit) or on a child’s fees to attend a nursery so the mother could attend to her small business.
5 See for instance judgments in Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Dr. (Mrs) Cecilia Ibru FHC/L/297C/2009;
Intercontinental Bank v. Erastus Bankole Oladipo Akingbola and others 2009 Folio 1680
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Loans for investment or production, as opposed to consumption are usually subsidized by the
government but because of credit rationing and the absence of regulation to curtail loan
concentration, only an elite class with the right collateral and payslips get to access such loans
which some go on to on-lend to informal consumers at a higher interest rate (Floro and
Yotopoulos in Roumasset 1992, p. 2184).
Informal Credit and Systemic Risk
We have examined the different ways that regulation undermines consumer welfare by pushing
consumers out of the formal market where there is prudential oversight of products, and into
the informal where regulatory standards are neither clear nor strongly enforced. The actions of
regulators and individual banks to protect solvency can also generate externalities which create
or increase systemic risks to the financial system (Caruana 2010). For example, informal
borrowing can impair the quality of collateral used to borrow in the formal market where an
informal lender takes over and depletes the asset before the formal lender could enforce the
collateral. Consumer subscription to safe products in the formal market, and unsafe products in
the informal market, raises the overall risk of default, if because of the unsafe product they
default on the safe product (Bar-Gill and Warren 2008, p. 5). Indeed dual market economies
produce information asymmetry (most informal debt is not captured by credit bureaus) that can
lead to an oversupply of credit through multiple lending (Degryse et al. 2012, p. 2) especially
to the rich borrowers responsible for the Nigeria banking crisis. The focus of the G-20, the
Financial Stability Board, the OECD High Level Principles on Consumer Credit, the World
Bank’s Good Practices on Consumer Protection, and the UN Guidelines on consumer protec-
tion indicate a broad recognition of the potentially destabilizing character of credit to the
economy (European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/48/EC; OECD 2011, p. 4; United
Nations Guidance on Consumer Protection 2016, p. 3; World Bank 2017, p. 8, 54, 73). The
quality of protection and the scope of protected consumers in developing countries remain
open to debate.
Over the last three decades, three important events have conditioned formal lenders in
Nigeria to restrict credit supply to elite borrowers or less than 6% of the adult population
(Euromonitor International 2018). These events include the introduction of the Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the World Bank/IMF in 1983 which emphasized privatiza-
tion, liberalization, and formalization; the banking consolidation exercise of the CBN; and the
BASEL II reforms (Sanusi 2010, p. 116; World Bank 1989, p. 3). Prior to SAP, the Nigerian
government required commercial banks to lend to rural consumers whose private financial
institutions would not ordinarily direct resources (World Bank 1989, p. 3). SAP, however,
forced the government to amongst other things dismantle interest rate controls and regulatory
mandates directing credit allocation. One implication of these changes and increased sensitiv-
ity to systemic risk concerns is that lower-end consumer borrowers in Nigeria owe too little,
and therefore pose very little risk to the financial system.
While the exact meaning of “systemic risk” remains unsettled (Cerutti et al. 2012; IMF
2009), it includes the risk that the entire financial system may fail, causing a general economic
collapse, as opposed to risk associated with an individual part of the system (Danielsson 2013).
The potential risk of consumer lending to the stability of the financial system is higher for
advanced economies, such that regulatory responses that might be justifiable in such econo-
mies, and the urgency attached thereto, will not necessarily be logical in the case of developing
markets. According to the IMF ( 2017, p. 55), “the negative medium-term consequences of
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increases in household debt are more pronounced for advanced than for emerging market
economies.” In theory, the CBN’s banking reforms heralding more stringent regulation of the
formal financial sector operates to responsibilize lenders and to rein in irresponsible lending.
But with credit rationing rampant, the reforms compromise consumer safety because informal
lenders to whom consumers turn are not within the purview of regulation and therefore are not
responsibilized in any real sense. The lack of transparency in that market makes it difficult not
only to measure the welfare benefits of credit products but also makes it harder to monitor
leverage levels.
Why Access Remains Important to the Poor
Access to safe credit products offers opportunities for households to accumulate wealth and
expand job opportunities (Bar-Gill and Warren 2008, p. 5). Credit cards, for example, render
payments for the purchase of goods and services convenient by reducing the amount of cash at
hand with the attendant exposure to the risk of theft or loss, and the risk of botched transactions
as a result of insufficient cash (Committee on Consumer Credit Law 1971, p. 117). People
borrow to smooth temporarily unstable income (Guerrieri and Lorenzoni 2011, pp. 1429–
1430), and particularly in times of wider economic downturn (Bertrand et al. 2010, p. 302;
Morgan et al. 2012, p. 519; Morse 2011, pp. 28–29), access to formal credit has a net positive
impact on the poor (Banerjee et al. 2015, p. 1; Lerner and Tufano 2011, p. 41).
The welfare risk of unregulated credit products is a different story. Access to unsafe or
unregulated credit products can have devastating welfare effects on consumers. Unregulated
lenders are often in the habit of soliciting customers and encouraging them to borrow,
sometimes with attractive terms that tend to grow consumers’ collective appetite for borrow-
ing, plunging families and businesses into excessive leverage for mostly uneconomic reasons
(Mazer et al. 2014, p. 1). The built-in responsible lending requirement that Nigerian banks
must not deduct beyond 35% of employee income does not apply to workers in the informal
market6 which means that some borrowers could easily become over-indebted or entrapped by
loan sharks. Consumer lending also has social detriments that are sometimes characterized as
the modern equivalent of slavery or peonage (James 2015, p. 2).
Access to consumer credit in the absence of effective regulation is not only detrimental to
the individual consumer but compromises the stability of the financial system. Credit is a
product, and like all products, it must satisfy set standards. The requirement for standards
regulation in credit markets is as salient as it would be in automobile, pharmaceutical, food,
and construction industries, amongst others (Bar-Gill and Warren 2008, p. 5). Consumer credit
products like credit cards and payday loans can create financial distress for borrowers,
economic losses for innocent third parties, and a state of economic instability for a country’s
economy (Bar-Gill and Warren 2008, p. 5; Campbell et al. 2012, p. 1224; Department of
Defence 2006, pp. 39–41; Eckholm 2006; Financial Conduct Authority 2017, p. 14; Harris
2011, p. 353; Melzer 2011, p. 517; Morgan et al. 2012, p. 519; Skiba and Tobacman 2008, p.
2; Zinman 2014). This is why they are regulated and why unregulated products can be
dangerous. Apart from the absence of responsible lending obligations that seek to protect
consumers from predatory lending, informal credit users are highly vulnerable to behavioural
exploitation as loan sharks operate a model that seeks to extract maximum interests from
6 See sections 5(7) and 48 Labour Act, CAP. L1 L.F.N. 2004
P. I.-O. Omede
desperate, poor, and boundedly rational borrowers. We must emphasize that borrowers in the
formal market are not immune to behavioural exploitation, but the lack of regulatory oversight
of the informal market significantly increases the level of consumer vulnerability (James 2015,
p. 2).
How Regulators Can Protect Lower-end Borrowers in Nigeria
The earliest reforms to increase financial inclusion in Nigeria dates to the proliferation of
Micro Finance Banks in 2005 as a response to the World Bank’s financial inclusion agenda to
curb poverty (CBN 2011, pp. 4–7). This coincided with the recapitalization of commercial
banks (and the consequential liquidity shortages that meant lower access for lower-end
consumers in the commercial bank segment). More recently, however, legislation has been
passed to ease access by all categories of consumers but especially the poor. The reforms
include the enactment of the Credit Reporting Act 2017 and The Secured Transaction in
Movable Assets Act 2017.
(i) The Credit Reporting Act
Until the 1980s, Nigerian credit markets remained excessively regulated, and the government
maintained cosy relationships with the country’s main banks and institutions, often tainted
with market-hampering corruption and cronyism (Research Republic 2016, p. 58). According
to the Central Bank, the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed rising non-performing credit
portfolios in banks and these significantly contributed to the financial distress in the banking
sector (Sanusi 2010, p. 2). A significant number of predatory debtors existed in the banking
system, and their survival strategy mostly involved the abandonment of their debt obligations
in some banks only to contract new debts in other banks (Sanusi 2010, p. 2). Regulators lacked
access to sufficient credit information, and this made it difficult to consistently classify credits
granted to certain borrowers and their associated companies.
In order to address this problem, a credit registry called the Credit Risk Management
System (CRMS) was established by sections 28 and 29 of the CBN Act No.24 of 1991 (as
amended). The enabling legislation empowered the CBN to obtain from all banks returns on
all credits with a minimum outstanding balance of NGN 100 000.00 (now N 1 million and
above of principal and interest), for compilation and dissemination by way of status report to
any interested party (i.e., operators or regulators) and compliance became mandatory (CBN
2018). This, however, failed to address information asymmetry in the consumer credit market
as most consumer borrowings fall below that threshold, and consequently impacted negatively
on access by the poor.
The enactment of the Credit Reporting Act 2017 (CRA) thus addresses the information
problem in the consumer credit market. The main objectives of the Act are to promote access
and risk management, increase transparency through information sharing, and establish
reporting standard, ultimately enhancing responsible lending and borrowing. Sections 1 and
12 (f) of the Act stops short of making “responsible lending and borrowing” a legal require-
ment but attempts to responsibilize lenders by requiring lenders to obtain a credit report from at
least one of the licensed credit bureaux before granting any form of credit. While the CRA is
not explicit on the penalties for non-compliant lenders, Sections 23 and 27 make non-
compliance with the provisions of the Act punishable by a fine (on lending institutions) and
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imprisonment upon conviction for authorizing officers. It is also not clear if lenders would be
penalized for granting credit to a borrower shown to be over-indebted by a credit report.
Experience from the Nigerian banking crisis has shown that lenders tend to focus more on the
margins on the principal loan sum than they are worried about losing the principal.
With the current restrictive access to credit in Nigeria, the reticence on affordability
assessment thresholds is understandable. Nevertheless, the reluctance to set such a strict
standard stands in contrast with emerging regulatory attitudes in other jurisdictions. An
increasing number of countries have introduced a statutory requirement to perform affordabil-
ity assessments in recent years, such as the EU Directive on Consumer Credit (2008) and the
Dodd Frank Act in the United States.7 Similar requirements are now in place in South Africa,
Mexico, Australia, and Uganda, amongst others with a few exemptions for educational loans.
Nigeria’s approach is, however, similar to that of the UK. Under the UK’s Consumer Credit
Act 2006 which amends the 1974 Act, the Credit Commissioner is empowered to suspend
irresponsible lenders from market participation, and courts are empowered to void “extortion-
ate” (now supplanted by an unfair relationship test), “grossly exorbitant” credit contracts, or
contracts that run against the principle of fair dealing. But in practice, even with greater
flexibility under the 2006 amendment, the courts have been very conservative, in most cases
interpreting ambiguous terms in favour of the lender (Fairweather 2012, p. 84). The similarity
of approach to the UK is also partially indicative of the continuing influence of the English
legal system on post-colonial Nigeria.
The most important contribution of the Credit Reporting Act 2017 to the development of
consumer credit market in Nigeria is contained in section 27 which expands reporting
obligation to a broad segment of informal market operators including co-operative societies
that offer credit to small, medium, and microenterprises, including individual consumers
(Davel 2013, p. 1). This segment of the market is responsible for originating most credit
facilities to consumers and the most opaque. Creditors in informal credit markets are more
likely to be irresponsible lenders with the aim to exploit poor hapless borrowers, but they
provide often much needed funds to their targets that they otherwise could not access in the
mainstream market (Wilson 2008, p. 91). The CRA therefore potentially introduces much
needed transparency into this market and also encourages mainstream lenders to lend to the
category of individuals that seek out loans in this market.
(ii) The secured transaction in movable assets Act 2017 (STMA)
The STMA is the second legislation in the reforms aimed at promoting financial inclusion,
especially access to consumer credit. The Act establishes via Sections 3 and 8, a National
Collateral Registry that makes it possible for lenders to register a “Financing Statement” over
movable collateral submitted by borrowers to secure a loan. Sections 12–18 of the STMA also
imposes the obligation to register a financing statement on the lender or someone acting on
their behalf. A financing statement must fully describe the identities of the lender and
borrower, the particulars of the loan (principal, term, interest, etc.), and the particulars of the
collateral. As soon as the creditor files this statement with the registrar, a confirmation
certificate is issued, creating a charge on the registered asset. This Act is expected to improve
the creditworthiness of individuals who owned movable assets of value but hitherto unable to
7 See Article 8, Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (Official Journal of the
European Union, L 133/66)
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access credit because such assets were not registrable. Ownership of collateral is a significant
determinant of access to credit (Bertola et al. 2006, p. 8). The STMA thus removes barriers to
accessing finance by millions of Nigerian farmers (e.g., livestock owners), artisans, and small
scale traders, particularly women who in many local customs, were unable to own fixed assets.
The STMA also attempts to minimize the problem of information asymmetry in the
consumer credit market which had built up as a result of a historically large and active
informal market. Borrowers tend to use the same collateral to access multiple loans while
lenders tend to use unorthodox tactics for debt recovery, including resort to violence and
bribing rogue police officers to deploy strong-arm tactics on their behalf. In theory, Section 8
of the STMA undermines illegal seizure of collateral as mere possession without registration of
collateral entitles a lender to no rights or title, while Section 6 (2) enables formal lenders to
enforce registered collateral into the hands of a third party. This is designed as a disincentive to
loan sharks who rely on the arbitrary seizure of collateral to survive in the market. Knowing
that those assets could be traced into their hands, make them liable to the creditor, and shine an
unwelcome spotlight into their business operations, their rational response is to avoid lending
or lending on illegal terms. The STMA addresses the information asymmetry of the consumer
loan market in two respects. First, it becomes difficult to use one collateral for multiple loans
secretly. Secondly, lenders are better informed to assess the material quality of collateral
submitted and how their legal rights compare to the borrower’s existing creditors. This is
especially significant as it minimizes systemic risk stemming from excessive lending. In
practice, however, it may not improve lending to the poor because lenders still have to factor
in the cost of tracing collateral into third party hands, and the risk is significant because of the
problem of slow judicial process highlighted earlier, and the uncertainties of dealing with an
informal lender who may not have a clear business address. Furthermore, although the
registration procedure appears simple and straightforward, the STMA does not stipulate a
time frame within which a financing statement may be registered. This has led legal practi-
tioners to raise questions about the priority of the lender’s registered interest vis-à-vis interests
created under parallel registries under section 179 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act
and the Bill of Sales Law of the various states in Nigeria (Ajayi 2017, p. 1).
The other relevant reform introduced by the STMA is the dispute resolution process.
Section 41 of the STMA establishes a Mediation and Dispute Resolution Panel regulated by
the CBN. This empowers poor borrowers to seek redress where their assets are unlawfully
seized by lenders without having to worry about the cost of litigation, which is often
protracted.
Are the Reforms Adequate?
The credit regulations discussed above have aimed to promote market resilience, transparency
and risk mitigation, fair treatment, and effective recourse for consumers although these
outcomes are the hallmarks of consumer protection, the assumptions that birth these reforms,
however, require closer scrutiny within the context of an emerging market.
The first assumption is that with greater transparency, there will be a greater supply of credit
(Rona-Tas 2016, p. 199). Credit reporting helps to amongst other benefits mitigate adverse
selection; punish defaulters through deterrence hence decrease moral hazard; loosen informa-
tion monopoly of lenders over borrowers; and reveal overextended clients as it reports the
entire debt profile (Rona-Tas 2016, p. 203). The assumption fails to account for the possibility
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of formal lenders opting to lend to a worse selection from a better pool of borrowers over a
better selection from a worse pool, regardless of the lessons of the 2009 crisis. Consumers are
thus subjected to a possibility of being refused credit regardless of their stellar or non-existing
credit history (Rona-Tas 2016, p. 202). The reliability of the credit reporting system in Nigeria
continues to be undermined by low data integrity, delays in reporting, and low participation of
non-bank financial institutions including informal lenders who account for the most lending
(Mylenko 2008, p. 11; Popoola 2018). Even where low-income individuals do have a positive
credit report, they still have to contend with the bias of lenders against consumer lending in
comparison to corporate or rich borrowers (Popoola 2018). Lenders rank the (un)known risk of
lower-end borrowers (information asymmetry) above the known risk (moral hazard) of
wealthy borrowers, i.e., the predictable reluctance of rich, powerful, and influential borrowers
to repay loans on time.
The second assumption is that with effective market competition and a collateral registry,
consumers would be able to access finance in the formal markets. One setback to this
assumption is the failure of regulators to recognize the need to play an increasing role in
addressing liquidity shortages in the financial sector. Although the welfare benefits of financial
inclusion have been questioned by critics (Lazarato 2016, p. 61; Soederberg 2014, p. 27, 46;
Stern 2016), Nigeria can promote financial inclusion by adopting policies that aim to eliminate
the obstacles to lower-end borrowers highlighted in previous sections. Financial inclusion in
this context would not be a substitute for social welfare programmes or creating jobs with
decent wages, but a component of these broader objectives. For example, OECD countries
responded to the GFC by extending consumption packages, adjusting tax policies to stimulate
demand, recapitalizing banks with explicit safeguards to enhance banks’ capacity for financing
SMEs including public credit guarantees, insurance, factoring for receivables, and better
payment discipline by governments (Sinha et al. 2011, p. 23). Additional measures included
cutting employment taxes or social security charges and extended temporary unemployment
programmes. In emerging market economies, India, for example, exempted hard-hit sectors
from compliance with the risk weights and general provisions on capital exposure (Sinha et al.
2011, p. 23).
In Nigeria, the federal government failed to implement fiscal policy initiatives to supple-
ment the CBN’s response (to bail out big time debtors), especially to guarantee to lend to
SMEs and consumers. This type of intervention reinforces the moral hazard of Too Big To Fail
and sends the wrong signal to lenders that it is safer to lend big to rich businessmen no matter
the risk than lend small to SMEs and consumers as the latter would not be bailed out. Rather
than introducing a stimulus programme aimed at boosting consumer lending, the Federal
Government introduced the Treasury Single Account in 2015 effectively transferring all
government accounts from deposit money banks to the CBN. The policy aims to promote
government accountability and transparency (Agbo et al. 2016, p. 185). It, however, exacer-
bated the liquidity crisis in the economy, which further undermines the government’s financial
inclusion agenda.
Finally, the CBN’s bank-led mobile banking model further constrains access by lower-end
borrowers as it prevents TELCOs and fintech start-ups from carrying on lending activities.8
There is a compelling case for liberalizing the licensing regime to accommodate different
categories of operators including TELCOs, banks, and Fintech start-ups. This is essential for
competition purposes but also because different operators can deliver complementary services
8 Mobile Money Regulatory Framework 2009
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for consumers in a way that a binary approach could not. It is an opportunity to extend
prudential oversight to a safer type of informal credit. First, TELCOs in Nigeria have far wider
coverage and distribution of access points compared to banks and thus better positioned to
reach rural communities where formal financial services are currently unavailable. According
to the Nigeria Inter-Bank Settlement Systems PLC (NIBSS), a total number of 51.7 million
bank account holders had been assigned biometric verification numbers by February 2017
compared to 154.1 million phone subscribers in the same period in 2017 and 93.3 million
unique subscribers (Nigerian Communications Commission 2018). Despite Nigeria’s multi-
SIMs culture which means that there are more active connections than individual subscribers
(GSMA 2017), TELCO access points across the country exceed commercial bank access
points.
Somalia and Kenya provide impressive examples of the gains of TELCO participation in
the mobile money market. In Somalia, bank account penetration stands at 15%, but TELCO-
led mobile money account penetration is over 73% despite the insecurity in Somalia (Firestone
et al. 2017). Consumers stand to benefit from TELCO participation in difficult business
terrains, especially northeastern Nigeria where Boko Haram terrorists have forced many banks
and financial institutions to close shop. Secondly, TELCOs have a larger customer base, and
the marginal cost of extending banking services to them is lower compared to banks. Thirdly,
fintech companies have demonstrated superior ability to deploy algorithms in creditworthiness
assessments in a way that commercial banks in the country have not been able to achieve. As
one of the biggest challenges to fintech product uptake by consumers is lack of awareness,
TELCOs have the advantage in terms of advertising as all it takes is an SMS delivered to
customers at no extra costs. There is a net benefit for borrowers from an all-inclusive market.
The new guidelines on Payment Service Banks do not go far enough because of specific
restrictions imposed to “level the field” for all competitors. The guidelines impose the same
documentation requirements for banks and fintech and systematically neutralizes the efficiency
gain from innovation that fintech lenders could leverage for lower product prices (Saigal
2019).
Conclusion
BASEL II capital and liquidity requirements to ensure strong and stable financial systems
inadvertently undermine the drive for financial inclusion in Nigeria. This is consistent with a
broader literature that finds a dissonance between international rulemaking and the regulatory
needs of developing markets. This dissonance is a logical consequence of excluding regulators
from developing countries from the roundtable where financial regulatory policy is conceived
and adopted. In the context of lending to lower-end consumers in Nigeria, as lending criteria
become more stringent, more consumers of finance are pushed into informal markets because
of liquidity-induced credit rationing. Overall, consumer protection is compromised because
stronger consumer protection rules for the formal sector benefits borrowers from formal
institutions who constitute the minority of borrowers in all markets. The majority of borrowers
operate in informal markets largely without prudential oversight and conduct supervision.
The existence of a larger informal market for the poor and a smaller formal market that
caters mostly to elite borrowers is unfair because it ensures that the poor continue to pay more
for credit and highly vulnerable to ruthless lenders. The disparity in access is predicated on the
latter’s private property rights and ability to provide valid collateral whereas the former are
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excluded not because they do not own properties but that they hold dead capital. Regulators,
therefore, must initiate regulation that transforms “dead capital” into “live capital.” Regulators
must also come to terms with the urgent need to address loan concentration and to stimulate
competition by allowing TELCOs and fintech companies to carry on banking business because
of their superior knowledge of lower-end markets. This will increase the Central Bank of
Nigeria’s burden of prudential oversight, but the costs to consumers of exposure to loan sharks,
given the sheer size of the informal market in Nigeria, and the benefits derivable from
regulatory protection outweigh that burden.
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